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Abstract
Current security regimens are grounded in the advancement of liberal peace. 
All inter-governmental organizations, most states and most donor agencies 
more or less accept as common sense the self-evident virtuosity and truth 
of the liberal peace project. However, there is a profound contradiction 
within this project in Africa in that while this security regimen might 
reflect the impulses of a neoliberal hegemony, the very basic foundations of 
a domestic hegemonic project are in the main wholly absent. Equally, the 
nature of underdevelopment and dependency in the continent continues to 
undermine even basic autonomous state formation. These disjunctures mean 
that there is a distinct contradiction in promoting the current dominant 
security regimen in post-conflict scenarios in Africa. Instead, the liberal peace 
needs to be understood as a transnational project aimed at opening up African 
spaces for continued foreign penetration and exploitation.
Résumé
Les régimes de sécurité actuels reposent sur l’avancement de la paix libérale. 
Toutes les organisations intergouvernementales, de nombreux États et la 
plupart des organismes donateurs, acceptent plus ou moins le sens commun 
donné au projet de paix libérale. Cependant, il existe une contradiction 
profonde au sein de ce projet en Afrique. Alors que ce schéma de sécurité 
pourrait refléter les impulsions d’une hégémonie néolibérale, les fondements 
vitaux d’un projet intérieur sont en général absents. De même, la nature 
du sous-développement et la dépendance du continent continuent de 
compromettre la formation d’un état basique d’autonomie. Ces disjonctions 
signifient qu’il y a une contradiction dans la promotion du régime dominant 
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de sécurité dans les scénarios post-conflit en Afrique. Au lieu de cela, la paix 
libérale doit être comprise comme un projet transnational visant à ouvrir des 
espaces africains pour la mobilité continue des étrangers et l’exploitation.
The promotion of the liberal peace as a security regimen and as an integral 
part of external attempts at peacebuilding, reflects the hegemony within the 
developed world vis-à-vis the best way to organize the polity. Hegemony here 
is understood to be ideological and moral leadership of society (Gramsci 
1971). It is reflected when ‘a certain way of life and thought is dominant 
[and when] one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its 
institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, 
morality, customs, religious and political principles’ (Williams 1960:587). 
In short, ‘The concept of hegemony… means political leadership based on 
the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and 
popularisation of the world view of the ruling class’ (Bates 1975:352).
The intellectual origins of the liberal peace are found in the peace research 
literature, with figures such as Johan Galtung (see e.g. Galtung 1975). A 
basic precept of this work is that there is a difference between what is called 
negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace is simply the absence of 
direct conflict, whilst positive peace seeks to address the structural causes of 
violence. These ideas can be found in the current liberal peace agenda, where 
stopping war is no longer adequate. Rather, crafting an ostensible long-
term and sustainable positive peace is the goal. This has unavoidably meant 
that post-conflict management within Africa requires close engagement to 
transform the socio-economic conditions of the affected country. Inevitably, 
the two overlapping spheres of capitalist societies, ‘political society’ (which 
governs through force) and ‘civil society’ (which governs via consent) are 
intimately involved. Manufacturing the liberal peace is achieved through 
the execution of a security regimen, which constitutes a particular vision of 
positive peace, which might be briefly summarized as the creation of a liberal 
democracy; the growth of ‘civil society’, the promotion of liberal human 
rights and the support for market liberalization (Ramsbotham 2000). This 
article aims to examine some key contradictions in the imposition of the 
liberal peace as a security regimen in Africa. 
The Liberal Peace Defined
The liberal peace is composed of various gradations: the victor’s peace, 
where the victor’s terms are forced upon the vanquished; the constitutional 
peace, based on the Enlightenment; institutionalized peace; and civil peace, 
grounded in civil society peace (Richmond 2005). All four depend on 
external interventions, elevating external actors to an omnipresent (if not 
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omnipotent) position. The variants of the liberal peace serve as discourses 
that often silence discussion of other alternatives and place the options 
elevated by the capitalist core at the heart of any dialogue. In Africa this 
has meant that African input into the construction of peace has often been 
subsumed and/or sidelined and ignored, with the imposition of Western 
notions of what constitutes ‘real’ peace – the liberal peace, in other words – 
achieving unquestioned status.
This project reflects the hegemony of liberal values that reigns in global 
politics. All inter-governmental organizations, as well as Western states 
and donor agencies, more or less accept as common sense the self-evident 
virtuosity and truth of the liberal peace project. This hegemony is reinforced 
and amplified by fact that the liberal peace is the foundation upon which the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) operate. This normative agenda is 
equally dominant within the United Nations system, with a broad consensus 
on what peacebuilding is, as well as what constitutes the fundamentals of 
any sustainable peace. All of this fosters an intellectual climate at the policy 
level in which the basic assumptions of what is effectively a security regimen 
go unproblematized, indeed are hegemonic. The key hypotheses behind the 
liberal peace and its security regimen fit with this situation and are deemed 
virtually unquestionable. 
The current agenda advanced by the main actors in any peacebuilding 
initiative in Africa is premised on the notion that liberalization i.e. liberal 
democracy and the ‘free market’ will facilitate positive peace. In this 
formulation, external actors are granted a pivotal role in wholesale attempts 
at societal transformation. It can be said that ‘peacebuilding is in effect an 
enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves 
transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization 
into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, 
pacification through political and economic liberalization’ (Paris 1997: 56). 
This has taken on an evangelistic fervour in most Western capitals. Indeed, 
as Eric Hobsbawm asserted:
We [the West] are at present engaged in what purports to be a planned 
reordering of the world by the powerful states…. The rhetoric surrounding 
this crusade implies that the system is applicable in a standardised (Western) 
form, that it can succeed everywhere, that it can remedy today’s transnational 
dilemmas, and that it can bring peace rather than sow disorder. It cannot 
(Hobsbawm 2007:115). 
This conceived reorganization of the world by the West is what Samir Amin 
has described as the ‘liberal virus’ (Amin 2005). In the context of post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts, this virus however is promoted as the cure for all ills. 
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However, the sort of policies being advanced as part of the liberal peace 
in post-conflict spaces cannot be readily implemented on populations in 
normal circumstances where popular resistance might disturb the process. 
Privatization, the ‘free market’ and other elements of the dominant discourse 
rather tends to stimulate greater societal dislocation, alongside exploitation, 
growing inequality and other pathologies. Two twin processes are thus 
required: a deeply traumatized population that is in a state of vulnerability 
and a form of politics that insulates elites from societal pressures and 
dissipates resistance. I shall first discuss the former element, before moving 
on to how ‘democratic politics’ in post-conflict spaces is the actual antithesis 
to self-realization by societies emerging from war.
Shock and Awe
Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine (2007) makes a compelling argument that 
societies emerging out of traumatic experiences, be they natural disasters, 
wars or major economic crises, are more prone to the implementation of 
neoliberalism than other social orders. Klein asserts that because of the 
intrinsic social contradictions inherent within neoliberal policies, political 
turmoil and a disoriented citizenry that spring from processes such as 
war may act as coercive pretexts for implementing neoliberal reforms, the 
type of which most of the affected public would in general reject under 
‘normal’ conditions. Klein demonstrates that neoliberalism has continually 
been applied in the absence of the compliance of the governed by taking 
advantage of a range of types of national ‘shock therapies’. To dazed 
populations emerging out of conflict, governments in league with external 
actors are more able to force through radical (and in due course damaging) 
‘free market’ policies that would never otherwise be put up with. 
In post-conflict spaces, what is presented to the IFIs and the UN system 
is a tabula rasa upon which the promoters of neoliberal capitalism believe 
their programmes can be implemented with minimal resistance. Klein 
uses the examples of Chile under Pinochet, Argentina under the military 
juntas, post-apartheid South Africa, post-Solidarity Poland, Russia under 
Yeltsin, the ‘reconstruction’ of Iraq post the US invasion, Sri Lanka after the 
tsunami and New Orleans post-Katrina. I suggest that we might also regard 
post-conflict spaces in Africa as fitting with Klein’s thesis and as offering 
the proponents of neoliberalism a great opportunity to reconstitute society 
along approved lines. What we see in such countries is a de-patterning of 
societies caused by war and this facilitates attempts to remake them from 
scratch. 
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After all, Milton Friedman (1962) wrote in his preface to Capitalism and 
Freedom that ‘Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change … 
our basic function [is] to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep 
them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically 
inevitable’. The politically impossible, in Friedman’s calculations, is for the 
state to vacate as much of the public space as possible, the economy in 
particular. As part of this project, governments must eliminate the rules 
and regulations (labour rights, safety standards etc.) that may reduce profit 
accumulation.  Secondly, any state activity that the private sector could 
be running at a profit should be privatized. This includes health care and 
education and may be extended into other social realms. Thirdly, state 
spending on social programmes should be considerably reduced. As such 
policies are intrinsically destabilizing and deeply unpopular, the opening 
that a conflict affords those in favour of such measures is immeasurably 
valuable. This is recognized by USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, 
and Humanitarian Assistance for example, which states that ‘In support 
of US foreign policy, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) seizes 
emerging windows of opportunity in the political landscape’ in traumatized 
societies (USAID 2017). As part of the attempt to remake societies in crisis 
along neoliberal lines, as per Klein’s thesis, there is a need to insulate the 
elites imposing such programmes from popular resistance. This is where 
‘democracy’ comes in.
The ‘Democratic Agenda’
Within the liberal peace security regimen, the discourse of ‘democracy’ has 
been central. Until the end of the Cold War, authoritarian and dictatorial 
styles of government were often seen as prerequisites for security in Africa 
(read: Western interests), hence Western support for a litany of brutal 
dictatorships across the continent was widespread. However, since the latter 
part of the 1980s, and after a much-hyped ‘wave of democracy’ washed 
over the continent, liberal democracy is now seen as the panacea for all 
of Africa’s ills. Most mainstream analyses have taken for granted a specific 
definition of democracy, taking Western models of liberal democracy as the 
normative standard by which democratization processes can be evaluated. 
This is then unthinkingly and teleologically transposed onto Africa (see e.g. 
Harkness 2015). What such analyses share is an extremely naive assumption 
that procedural models of electoral activities constitute ‘democratization’. 
Such a preoccupation with the technical formulae fits with the agenda being 
advanced by Western actors, whose political repertoire is dominated by 
references to ‘good governance’ as the foundation of the liberal peace. 
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However, this ‘good governance’ agenda comprises only very hollow 
democratic institutional forms (if existing at all), crafted to advance a specific 
type of democracy harmonious with the further promotion of capitalist 
liberalization (Abrahamsen 2000). Yet the type of neoliberal precepts that 
underpin the contemporary liberal peace project helps contribute to a 
continuation of profoundly undemocratic systems. This is quite deliberate 
and understandable given that ‘struggles for popular democracy around the 
world are profound threats to the privileges of US-led Northern elites and 
their junior counterparts in the South’ (Robinson 1996:649). 
A means by which struggles against the imposition of key precepts of the 
liberal peace and privileged internal and external interests can be defended 
is required from the elite perspective. In the context of neoliberal reforms, 
whereby the state is ‘rolled back’, traditional forms of social control need 
to be reinvented and consent secured alongside coercion. This consensual 
mechanism of social control is part and parcel of the globalizing neoliberal 
economic project, adding legitimacy via liberal democratic systems to a 
specific economic (though not necessarily developmental) model. For 
Graf (1996:41), ‘Democratisation nowadays has become … a hegemonic 
discourse allowing the North to define the South in its own image’. In 
support, Hyden (1997:236) avers that ‘support for [democratization] 
efforts in Africa is part of a global strategy to promote “Western” values and 
institutionalise political regimes that are likely to be non-belligerent and 
generally positive towards the realisation of the liberal paradigm’.
Indeed, ‘the framing and circumscribing of democratic thought and 
discourse in terms of the precepts of polyarchy can be understood as an 
effort by core state elites to solidify and stabilise the hegemony which 
safeguards their positions of power and privilege’ within the global economy 
(Neufeld 1999).1 Polyarchy aims to soothe the social and political pressures 
that are created by the neoliberal order and creates a state of ‘low intensity 
democracy’ (Gills, Rocamora and Wilson 1993). Such an analysis echoes 
the assertion that ‘the construction of a corporate-dominant order would 
… require the neutralisation of social forces precipitating persistent and 
effective questioning of the established order’ (Harrod 1997:108). By its 
very nature, polyarchy dissipates the energies of those marginalized by the 
ongoing order into parliamentary procedures that are in themselves acted 
out by political fractions whose power and prestige are dependent on the 
polyarchical model. 
Furthermore, polyarchy is based on a conscious divorce of ‘economics’ 
from ‘politics’ (at a time when neoliberalist impulses push for a greater 
interpenetration of the two, if not a domination of the former over the 
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latter). By doing so, the polyarchical process limits itself to the ‘purely 
political’ except on assenting or dissenting over trivial modifications to 
macro-economic policy. As Bukovansky (2007:181) notes, 
Liberal democracy is often presented as a technical prescription for curing 
a host of ills, rather than as a political value to be debated and adapted to 
particular conditions. Use of the term ‘technical assistance’ to describe a broad 
array of policies designed to disseminate proper institutional forms from the 
liberal core to the non-liberal or quasi-liberal periphery is symbolic of the 
prevailing wisdom. Sending advisors who show local authorities how to set 
up elections or courts or banking systems is presented as a technical rather 
than a political act. Calling such dissemination of ideas ‘technical’ links them 
to science and engineering, rather than politics and ethics. It gives them an 
aura of value-neutrality and scientific validity.
Through this process, the type of politico-economic arrangements being 
crafted as part of the liberal peace are legitimized – after all, suffrage has 
been universalized and hence grievances are remedied via the ballot box, not 
mass action or self-development:
[T]he combination of economic and political liberalism [in polyarchy] 
is … not democracy per se … but that is not the point; the point is that 
the dominant discourse has determined that it is. And of course economic 
liberalism is but another term for capitalism, so that capitalism appears as 
the economic face of democracy, thus downplaying the negative associations, 
in the South, between capitalism and imperialism and collapsing the elite 
ideological construct into [an] amorphous but demagogically effective concept 
of democracy (Graf 1996:44). 
This process acts to bolster the structural position of those African political 
elites that enjoy the status and trappings of power through involvement in 
this arrangement. Their activities are shifted away from active democratic 
intercourse with their constituencies and further and further towards 
identification and solidarity with external actors. Post-conflict spaces are of 
interest in this process as it is here that we might observe – via the imposition 
of the liberal peace project – the imperialist nature of neoliberalism at its 
most naked with regard to the security regimens that are implemented. 
Here, imperialism ‘is defined not by the export of capital, but by the export 
of capitalism: the social relations of production that define it and institutions 
devised to promote and sustain them. Second, as the central role of the UN 
suggests, it is led not by states but by international organizations committed 
to capitalism as a global project’ (Cammack 2006:230). Embedding these 
policies in post-conflict spaces is at the heart of the liberal peace security 
regimen in Africa. 
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Civil Society: Winning Hearts and Minds
According to Cammack (2006: 230), ‘the leaders of the [neoliberal] project, 
in their efforts to embed and legitimise it, have worked as much through 
NGOs and “civil society” as through governments’. Moreover, ‘[s]pecialists, 
operating out of policy groups, foundations, think-tanks, university research 
institutes, and government agencies, bring long-range political considerations 
and issues concerning social stability to the attention of the dominant classes 
and their inner core in the corporate community’ (Robinson 1996:27). By 
doing so, such activities constitute the vital mediating link between agency 
and structure in the development of policy and the building of hegemony. 
By acting within the realm of civil society, these activities are engaging the 
territory where hegemony is contested and (eventually) achieved, for ‘in 
times of crisis the institutions of civil society remain as the primary site of 
the cohesion of new political forces that may create a new order’ (Murphy 
1994: 31). 
This understanding tends to undermine the naïve belief that civil 
society is in itself a ‘good thing’, which mechanically enhances democracy 
and accountability. Instead, such a scenario can actually strengthen the 
position of the economic/political elites whilst providing a useful façade of 
legitimacy in the form of ‘civil society’. As one analyst wrote on the tactic by 
the West of strengthening civil society in Africa, ‘Assisting [elements within 
civil society] will lead to better economic decisions as well as strengthen 
governance: letting a hundred flowers bloom on the capitalist side of the 
civil society will help establish the rule and norms enabling societies to run 
themselves along the lines required by capital’ (Moore 1996:140). 
Of course, in many African countries, the bourgeois-like ‘autonomous 
agentic individual’ described by the dominant paradigm, the essential 
prerequisite in the making of civil society itself, is absent (Fatton 1999: 
3). This is where donor funding of ‘acceptable’ organizations and/or the 
outright manufacture of such bodies is crucial as a means of informing and 
directing public debate towards neoliberal solutions to post-conflict crises. 
Such bodies can also serve as helpful mediating agents (organic intellectuals) 
for establishing a hegemonic project. In Africa, the proliferation of 
NGOs has seen them behave similarly to non-profit consultancies, taking 
instructions from their funders in the West. This is nothing short of latter-
day imperialism (Hearn 2007).
Exercises around such processes are integral to both the closure of debate 
during post-conflict transitions and to shaping the discourse around which 
post-war policies are formulated. The importance of this aspect of civil 
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society is ‘that the consensus forged by these experts over the identification 
[and solution] of problems shapes the way that interests of states are defined’ 
(Mittelman 1997:255). By acting thus, and in the absence of any strong 
alternative, business-aligned and donor-friendly elements within civil 
society – invariably donor-funded – contribute to the marginalization of 
any contrary impulses during the transition. 
This limiting of the terrain of debate is essential for the elite classes 
as many of the conflicts that the advocates of liberal peace are seeking to 
resolve were predicated at the grassroots level around a form of resistance 
and revulsion of the anodyne form of democracy previously practised and 
abused by incumbent elites. In the absence of even nominal democracy, 
very often revolts were based on a deep antipathy towards the extant social 
order. Installing a popular democracy would thus pose a real threat to the 
ongoing capitalist order and the wider class interests that benefit from such 
a milieu (Friedman 1987). Indeed, very often amongst the rebel factions 
fighting in conflicts, capitalism and elitist forms of government were viewed 
as aggregate aspects of oppressive systems. Liberation rhetoric in such 
circumstances was then consciously anti-capitalist. Yet as a result of such 
aspirations, a means by which struggles can be undermined and privileged 
interests defended becomes imperative for the local elites, acting in tandem 
with their senior partners in the North. In such milieus, local groups within 
civil society that can marshal impressive international allies to contest the 
definition and uses of democratic institutions impose boundaries within 
which the discourse on what constitutes ‘democracy’ is defined, discussed 
and promoted (Koelble 1999:10).
These parameters are invariably defined as the ‘middle ground’, and 
space may be opened up for various contenders to negotiate themselves 
within this framework – a framework that is predicated upon variants of 
liberal democracy as the ‘common sense’ model upon which any post-
conflict dispensation may be based. By doing so the ‘natural’ and ‘superior’ 
explanations that neoliberalism provides are advanced. After all, the 
superiority of the neoliberal ideology and its evident common sense has 
emerged from an ostensibly ‘free’ debate (the mythical free market of ideas, 
central to liberal delusions about how politics is practised), where alternative 
viewpoints must surely have been proffered and shown to be lacking upon 
inspection. This process in fact has seen the elevation of neoliberalism as 
la pensée unique and the market as the ultimate arbiter of what is or is not 
acceptable, both economically and politically, and, increasingly, socially. 
Similar attempts to create ‘realistic’ options for post-conflict policy 
choices are part and parcel of interventions into civil society by advocates of 
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the liberal peace, facilitating ideological conditions and a close fit between 
power, ideas and institutions for the construction of hegemony (Gill 1990). 
Such activities need not stem from a restricted intellectual base – indeed 
diversity is important as a self-legitimizing device – ‘narrow orthodoxy or 
exclusiveness would be a self-defeating criterion’, thus the ideas within the 
ranks of the organic intellectuals activators ‘reach the outer boundaries of 
what might be ultimately acceptable’ (Cox 1979: 260). In many respects, 
it is the quantity of advice and the message that is given within a particular 
remit from a particular epistemic community that counts, as well as the 
negative shaping of what is not possible.
However, at this point it can be asserted that a project based on 
liberalization, privatization and representing the dislocating effects of 
globalization has little chance of becoming hegemonic in Africa. For sure, 
a hegemonic project in the Gramscian sense needs a ‘politics of support’ as 
well as a ‘politics of power’, however mighty transnational capital and its 
state allies may be (Gamble 1988). This fundamental problem in advancing 
the liberal peace as a successful project in Africa, despite the hegemonic 
support it may enjoy at the global level, is massively compounded by the 
absence of hegemony in post-colonial Africa. Such a reality militates against 
any triumphant application of the liberal peace on the continent. What is 
left, then, is a virtual peace, satisfactory to donors and external actors, and 
also to the connected domestic elites, but not broadly sustainable nor able 
to enjoy hegemonic support. This conundrum is what I now turn to.
The Post-colonial African State and the Absence of Hegemony 
Due to the manner in which colonialism created artificial states in Africa and 
the nature of the independence process in most African countries, the ruling 
classes lack hegemony over society, at least in the Gramscian understanding of 
the concept (Gramsci 1971). By the ruling class, we mean the senior political 
elites and bureaucrats, the leading members of the liberal professions, the 
nascent bourgeoisie and the top members of the security arms of the state 
(Markovitz 1987:8). The early years of postcolonial nationalism in Africa 
were, broadly speaking, an attempt to build a project which bound society 
together around more issues than simply discontent with the imperial 
powers. This project quickly collapsed into autocracy and failure, a process 
accelerated by dynamics linked to the Cold War and to the failure by the 
new political leaders to make a decisive break from the past. Indeed, ‘the 
nationalist movement which arose from the contradictions of the colonial 
economy achieved political independence not economic independence’ 
(Ake 1981:93). Consequently, ‘unlike the ascending bourgeoisie of Europe, 
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which transformed all political and economic institutions into its own 
image and became socially hegemonic, the petit-bourgeoisie in Africa has 
no criteria of its own, it merely inherited colonial institutions with which 
the mass of the people did not identify’ (Nabudere 2011:58).
Of course, ‘Africa’s leaders are neither autonomous nor robots; they 
reflect diverse class and fractional interests located within the continent but 
separable from their extra-continental connections’ (Shaw 1985:5). These 
interests vary from state to state and within each state too: ‘state power rests 
in the hands of a local class or classes which constitute the ruling class. This 
class or classes have their own class interests arising from the place they 
occupy in social production’ (Shivji 1980:7). How the centralized organs of 
the state relate to the external depends on the positions of various domestic 
classes and the balance of forces between the external and the internal. 
Indeed, ‘African interests can expel and exclude external interests should 
they wish to do so. In practice they rarely exercise this option, preferring 
to modify the “balance of power” over time through almost continuous 
negotiation’ (ibid.:11). One major reason for this is due to the development 
of a colonial elite (Amadi 2012), created by the uneven nature of dependent 
development (Friedmann and Wayne 1977:413). These ruling cliques are 
attached to the centre often through corruption (Okowa 1995; Ndikumana 
and Boyce 2011). The connection between these cliques aligns many 
African nations’ economic, political and social policies towards those of the 
core (Sekhri 2009:248). This is arguably the ultimate cause of failure (Amin 
2002).
Within the realm of the superstructure, moral and political modes that rise 
above notions of economic–corporate interests, and instead reflect broader 
ethico-political ones, have remained missing in most parts of Africa even 
today. Consequently, because the ruling classes have been unable to preside 
over a hegemonic project that is viewed as legitimate by the majority of 
domestic society, they have been forced to revert to modalities of governance 
that seeks to dominate (if not destroy) opponents. These are commonly 
expressed through both the threat and actual use of violence and the 
immediate disbursal of material benefits to supporters within the context of 
neo-patrimonial regimes (LeVine 1980; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Medard 
1982; Callaghy 1984; Sandbrook 1985; Callaghy 1987; Crook 1989; Bayart 
1993; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Chabal 1994; Bratton and Van de 
Walle 1997; Tangri 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Without these twin 
strategies the ruling elites in much of Africa cannot maintain order. After 
all, ‘the state [in Africa], unlike the bourgeois state, is not entrenched in the 
society as a whole. It is …  a bureaucratic connivance’ (Mafeje 1992: 31). 
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What ideological legitimacy, ‘in the sense of a theoretical legitimation of the 
status quo … is expressed in the concept of “development”, which is “that 
which we are all in favour of” and given statistical respectability in figures 
measuring the growth of commodity production’ (Williams 1982: 40). But 
often, beyond such rhetoric, the substance of this belief in ‘development’ is 
pretty thin.  
The sort of political culture that has matured has had important 
consequences for Africa, further adding to the problematique of 
underdevelopment. In general, the modes of governance in Africa have 
encouraged despotism and unpredictability. As a result, for most of the 
postcolonial period, much of Africa has been trapped in cycles of crises, 
which have stimulated societal conflict. In the absence of hegemony, 
Africa’s leaders have relied on effected control and patronage. Although 
Africa’s elites undoubtedly command the state apparatus with varying levels 
of intensity, their own practices often undermine and subvert the state’s 
institutions and the effectiveness of its bureaucracy on a daily basis. Because 
most African elites exercise power in circumstances that lack hegemony, 
the relative autonomy of the state is absent and their rule is intrinsically 
unstable (Fatton 1999). This means that there is very little political space to 
allow reform and autocracy is relied on as a means of control. 
Central to this milieu is the fact that class power in Africa is 
fundamentally dependent upon state power and capturing the state – 
or at least being linked favourably to those within the state – and is an 
essential precondition for acquisition and self-enrichment. ‘The absence of 
a hegemonic bourgeoisie, grounded in a solid and independent economic 
base and successfully engaged in a private accumulation of capital, has 
transformed politics into material struggle’ (Fatton 1988:34). As a result, 
the bourgeoisie in Africa is generally weak and nascent. This translates into 
an absence of bourgeois hegemony, resulting in autocracy and economic 
irrationality. ‘Political instability is … rooted in the extreme politicization of 
the state as an organ to be monopolized for absolute power and accelerated 
economic advancement’ (Fatton 1988:35). Instead of a stable hegemonic 
project that binds different levels of society together, what we have in Africa 
is an intrinsically unstable personalized system of domination. Absolutism 
reigns and power is maintained through patrimonial power via the illegal 
commandeering of state resources. Corruption, not hegemonic rule, is the 
cement that binds the system together and links the patron and his predatory 
ruling class together (Fatton 1988:36). When this falls apart, what is left is 
warlordism (Reno 1998). Of course, given that one of the prescriptions of 
the liberal peace is liberal democracy, the willingness of actors to partake in 
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competitions where they might lose – and the linked willingness of losers to 
surrender power – hugely compromises the basic assumptions of the liberal 
peace. A mythical Africa is the terrain upon which the liberal peace is being 
asked to navigate.
The fact is that a hegemonic project that encompasses national 
development and a broad-based productive economy is far less of a concern 
(and in fact, might stimulate opposition) to elites within neo-patrimonial 
systems than the continuation of gainful utilization of resources for the 
individual advantage of the ruler and his clientelistic networks. Where the 
bureaucracy still exists, it has developed its own set of interests (personal 
survival) and logic as prebendary organizations that further distort their 
role away from the ideal-type rational–bureaucratic model inherent in 
the representations of developmental agencies and the UN family more 
towards a loose set of skeleton institutions lacking in most capacities other 
than to act as predators upon the population or gatekeepers to resources. 
Paradoxically,
Intense processes of class formation based on the struggle to death between 
contending blocs to capture the state for the establishment of predatory rule, 
and the utter dependence of African societies on external constellations of 
financial and military power, have ultimately contributed to the decay of the 
African state (Fatton 1999:4). 
Such a milieu necessarily breeds a deep reluctance to give up state power 
as capturing the state – or at least being linked favourably to those who 
command its apparatus – and is usually a precondition for acquisition and 
self-enrichment. Questions of national development are deemed abstract and 
unimportant unless they either directly threaten the incumbents’ positions 
or can be utilized to garner increased resource flows. If political elites do 
ever articulate a vision for the country, ‘their notion of emerging out of 
economic backwardness amounts essentially to Westernisation’, where ‘the 
general trend is to try and stimulate economic growth within the context 
of the existing neo-colonial economic structure’ (Ake 1981:139). This is 
indeed an accurate appraisal of the contemporary ‘development strategies’ 
which characterize much of Africa.
The external domination of Africa’s economies and the pathologies of 
dependency that this engenders, constructed during the colonial period, 
have proven markedly resilient. ‘The root dilemma of Africa’s economic 
development has been the asymmetry between the role of the continent 
in the world and the degree to which that world … has penetrated Africa’ 
(Austen 1987:271). Broadly speaking, ‘The rigidity of the international 
division of labour has not allowed African economies to break out of the role 
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of primary producers, for reasons which include lack of access to technology, 
the comparative advantage of the industrialised nations in manufacturing, 
and the constraints of the domestic market’ (Ake 1981: 92). Walter Rodney 
captures this reality:
African economies are integrate into the very structure of the developed 
capitalist economies; and they are integrated in a manner that is unfavourable 
to Africa and insures that Africa is dependent…. [S]tructural dependence is 
one of the characteristics of underdevelopment (Rodney 2012 [1972]: 25). 
In short, ‘the geo-economy of [Africa] depends on two production systems 
that determine its structures and define its place in the global system: 1) the 
export of “tropical” agricultural products: coffee, cocoa, cotton, peanuts, 
fruits, oil palm, etc.; and 2) hydrocarbons and minerals: copper, gold, rare 
metals, diamonds, etc.’ (Amin 2010:30). This has not radically changed 
since independence and will certainly not be changed by the liberal peace 
security regimen. 
Indeed, the demands of the liberal peace vis-à-vis procedural democracy 
(measured by election cycles) and economic liberalization only help cement 
post-conflict African states into structures of dependency. True development 
and independence are not on the agenda; in fact the elements of the liberal 
peace are designed so as to preclude such expressions of African agency. 
Rather, locking-in neoliberal reforms and granting a thin veneer of legitimacy 
is at the heart of the liberal peace security regimen. Good governance issues 
may be seen in this light as a means to ‘reformulate and redefine the public 
sphere and rules for economic policy, according to orthodox market-
monetarists postulates in macroeconomics (fiscal and monetary policy) 
and microeconomics (e.g. trade, labour market and industrial policy)’ (Gill 
1998: 30). These serve as the vanguard in societal restructuring, further 
acting to constrain the autonomy of domestic elites, whilst at the same time 
bolstering the position of those fractions sympathetic to the agenda being 
advanced by the donors. Either way, the project of rebuilding society after 
conflict is, in the final analysis, controlled by non-African actors.  
Conclusion
The hegemony surrounding what is needed to foster a positive peace can be 
linked to the broader global political economy. ‘Since capitalism encompasses 
the entire globe, its architects require a universal vision, a picture of a 
globally conceived society, to join classes in different countries … [in order] 
to institutionalise global capital accumulation by setting general rules of 
behaviour and disseminating a developmentalist ideology to facilitate the 
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process’ (Mittelman and Pasha 1997: 51). The liberal peace can thus be 
conceived as part of this process, confirming the long-held assertion that 
capital ‘compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois 
mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation 
into their midst’ (Marx and Engels 2004 [1888]: 38). At issue then is the 
question of whether or not the promotion of the liberal peace is actually a 
rather ill-disguised attempt at promoting capitalist restructuring in post-
conflict societies in Africa. I suggest that this is indeed so.
Certainly, when we examine the UN, we see that ‘systematic institutional 
reform pursued by Kofi Annan after he became UN Secretary-General at 
the beginning of 1997 … effected a shift from security through peace-
keeping (Annan’s previous remit) to security through capitalist hegemony, 
and succeeded by 2005 in transforming the UN into the lead agency for the 
global dissemination of capitalist values and imperatives’ (Cammack 2006: 
229–30). In the post-Cold War era, it has been possible for the advocates of 
neoliberalism to reframe the very underpinning of what constitutes peace 
and post-conflict re-building (the ‘liberal peace’) in quite explicit directions. 
The UN’s understanding of what peace and security is underscores this 
point:
In the post-Cold War era, peace and security can no longer be defined 
simply in terms of military might or the balance of terror. The world has 
changed. Lasting peace requires more than intervention of Blue Helmets on 
the ground. Effective peace-building demands a broader notion of human 
security…. In today’s world, the private sector is the dominant engine of 
growth; the principal creator of value and wealth; the source of the largest 
financial, technological, and managerial resources. If the private sector does 
not deliver economic and economic opportunity – equitably and sustainably 
– around the world, then peace will remain fragile and social justice a distant 
dream (Annan 1997). 
The whole point of the liberal peace’s security regimen is to construct the 
institutional framework that will allow the private sector to ‘deliver’ and 
work its magic in post-conflict spaces. The liberal peace project cannot be 
divorced from such realities. However, its true goals are hidden by various 
discourses, which seek to mask their own partialities and present as wholly 
commonsensical the components contained within peacebuilding projects. 
The effect is to present a set of policies infused with the disciplines and class 
logic of capitalism as if they were inspired by disinterested benevolence. 
In effect, the liberal peace security regimen ignores and obscures the 
fundamental fact that ‘political power, properly so called, is merely the 
organised power of one class for oppressing another’ (Marx and Engels 2004 
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[1888]: 60–61). It is, in short, an ideology masquerading as objective facts. 
Uncovering this and the interests that lie behind it is the essential first step 
towards proposing alternatives. As Gramsci notes:
For the philosophy of praxis, ideologies are anything but arbitrary; they are 
real historical facts which must be combated and their nature as instruments 
of domination revealed, not for the reasons of morality etc. but for reasons of 
political struggle: in order to make the governed intellectually independent 
of the governing, in order to destroy one hegemony and create another, as a 
necessary moment in the revolutionising of praxis (1988:196). 
The possibilities of alternative space do exist. As has been noted, there is 
a profound contradiction within the liberal peace project in Africa, which 
means that other policies are vital. The contradiction is namely that whilst 
the liberal peace might reflect the impulses of a transnationalized neoliberal 
hegemony, in Africa the very basic foundations of a domestic hegemonic 
project are in the main wholly absent. This disjuncture means that there is 
a general failure to situate the liberal peace in Africa in its proper context, as 
well as a distinct naiveté in evaluating its potential to bring about change in 
post-conflict scenarios on the continent. But this reality opens up interesting 
possibilities for social organization in Africa.  
Scepticism towards the liberal peace is based largely on an understanding 
of how politics in Africa works under conditions of postcolonial 
underdevelopment. Unsurprisingly, the empirical state in Africa does not 
conform to Western conceptions of the Weberian state, something which 
is a given within the liberal peace. Indeed, it is precisely the rational–
bureaucratic and hegemonic state that is taken as an assumed given 
within liberal peace prescriptions. This is hugely problematic as many of 
the accepted features of a democratic state are simply not present in large 
swathes of the continent. As Walter Rodney noted, ‘African economies are 
integrated into the very structure of the developed capitalist economies; and 
they are integrated in a manner that is unfavourable to Africa and insures 
that Africa is dependent’ (2012 [1972]:25). In underdeveloped and poverty-
stricken state formations, the superstructure takes on specific features that 
do not easily lend themselves to the type of governance required for liberal 
democracy to prosper.  
There is thus a profound disjuncture between the hegemonic support 
neoliberalism, and its manifestation as the liberal peace, enjoys at the global 
level and the general absence of hegemony locally in most post-conflict 
spaces. Such a reality militates against any successful application of the liberal 
peace and calls into question the very viability of most of the project’s policy 
prescriptions, expectations and basic assumptions. As noted previously, 
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what is left then is a virtual peace guaranteed by security regimens. These are 
generally acceptable to donors and other external actors, and also to their 
associated African allies, but are not maintainable without massive external 
support (de facto neo-colonialism), nor capable of benefitting from broad-
based support by the bulk of the citizenry. 
The liberal peace, then, replicates the classic errors of assumption that 
the IFIs made (and continue to make) vis-à-vis Structural Adjustment 
Programmes and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, as they are founded on 
a series of deeply imperfect suppositions:
[The externals] posit that development can be “private-driven,” and that 
African bourgeoisies can suddenly have a change of heart and become the 
engine of the take-off, whereas these bourgeoisies have never shown any 
commitment to sustained productive investment. They posit that privatization 
leads necessarily to rational economic decisions and that private agents are 
inherently more virtuous and efficient than public servants, whereas revenues 
derived from the sale of state assets can be stolen and squandered, and private 
agents are bent on defending their own selfish interests rather than the 
collective good. They posit that democratic governance is compatible with 
the imposition of fiscal austerity in an environment which is already suffering 
from acute material deprivation, whereas SAPs’ huge social costs are unlikely 
to be tolerated by docile and passive populations. Finally, they posit that 
trade liberalization will promote more efficient African economies whereas 
Africa’s small industrial base is incapable of withstanding and surviving foreign 
competition without public protection (Fatton 1999:4).
Characterized by continued economic crises stimulated by underdevelopment 
and typified by enduring clientelism and a pattern of ongoing foreign 
aid disbursements, the ‘international community’ and the continent’s 
leaders continue business pretty much as usual, even in post-conflict 
spaces. Sometimes the faces change, but the broad patterns remain. The 
tenets of the liberal peace and its security regimen are, it is suggested, 
part of this configuration, confirming Kwame Nkrumah’s description of 
neo-colonialism, whereby ‘the State which is subject to it is, in theory, 
independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. 
In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from 
outside’ (Nkrumah 1965:ix). 
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